There is a very common misbelief that Pakistan was founded, like Israel, to fulfill a religious ideal, to create an Islamic state and Islamic society for the Muslims of India, where they can practice Islam freely. The regime of general Zial-ul-Haq had declared likewise that Pakistan was created on the basis of Islam; he stated (Tariq Ali 2002:156) ‘Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out Judaism from Israel and it will collapse like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular, it would collapse’. (Alavi 1986:21) ‘Lacking a popular mandate, the military regime had sought its claim to legitimacy, if not its purpose, in divine ordinance’.

(Alavi, 1986:21) ‘The irony of the argument that Pakistan was founded on religious ideology lies in the fact that practically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that was, specifically, religious-Islamic was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly opposed the Pakistan Movement. The fact remains that Islam was not at the centre of Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate in Pakistan after the nation was created. The Pakistan Movement was not a movement of Islam, but of Muslims’.

(Alavi, 1986: 22) ‘The Bengal case is particularly relevant for illustrating not only the contingent nature of (Muslim) ethnicity but also the fact that neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League intended to create a state exclusively of Muslims or an Islamic state. Faced in M ay 1947 with the carving up of Bengal between India and Pakistan, influential Muslim as well as Hindu (congress) leaders of Bengal came together in support of an alternative plan for a united independent Bengal. Bengal Muslim League’s Suharwardy and some of his colleagues reached an agreement with Congress leaders Chandra Bose, Kiran Shankar Roy and other in support of the idea. It is most significant in the circumstances that this plan also had Jinnah’s full support. After Suharwardy (on behalf of Bengal leadership) had presented Mountbatten the plan for an independent Bengal side by side with independent India and Pakistan; the later asked Jinnah what his attitude to such a plan would be, in the record of his interview with Jinnah, Mountbatten wrote; ‘I asked Mr.Jinnah straight-out what his views were about keeping Bengal united at the price of its remaining out of Pakistan. He said without any hesitation, ‘I would be delighted, what is the use of Bengal without Calcutta, they had much better remain united and independent (Jalal and Sugata Bose,1997: 184-185) The plan was vetoed by the Congress high command, (Nehru & Patel) however, and Mountbatten accepted their veto’. From this plan of an independent Bengal it is very clear that Jinnah’s aim was not that of bringing together all Muslims of India under a single state at any price.

After the creation of Pakistan, (Abdus Sattar 199: 1) Jinnah’s idea about what the new state should be like was very clear as can be seen from his speeches and statements. In his address to the people of United States, in February 1948, he said, ‘In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis-but they all are Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan’. Jinnah in his first speech to the constituent Assembly of Pakistan stated the principle on which the new state was to be founded, he said (Akbar S. Ahmad 1997:175) ‘You may belong to any religion or caste or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of the state, we are starting with this fundamental principle that we all are the citizens of one state. In the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state’.

The Arrival of Militant Islam:
(Ahmad Rashid 1996:160) ‘The rise in Militancy and sectarian conflicts in Pakistan has its roots in the intensification of regional conflicts, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the start of the Afghan War in 1980s, Zia’s Islamization project and Pakistan’s failure to contain the impact of these development on its domestic politics. The Iranian Revolution changed the character of sectarian politics in Pakistan. Its impact on Shias was, however, more direct and that in turn influenced the politics of Sunni activism as well’. (Mushahid Hussain 1993) ‘The ideological force of the Revolution combined with the fact that the first Islamic revolution had been carried out by Shias, emboldened the Shia community and politicized its identity. Soon after the success of the revolution in Tehran, zealous emissaries of the revolutionary regime actively organized Pakistan’s shias.

(S.V.R.Nasr 2002:87) ‘Most important, the Zia regime was then in the midst of an ambitious Islamization project, which sought to transform government institutions, legal codes and policy making apparatuses in accordance with Islamic teachings. General Zia’s Islamization initiative, set in motion in 1979, claimed to manifest a universal Islamic vision. But in reality it was based on narrow Sunni interpretations of Islamic theology and law, and was therefore unacceptable to the Shias. In addition, Shias viewed Zia’s Islamization as a threat to their social position in Pakistan. The Shias made their opposition known when the Zia regime sought to implement Sunni law of inheritance and Zakat (the obligatory Islamic alms tax). The TJP (Tahrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Shias most powerful militant organization, when the TJP moved towards the pursuit of constitutional politics, Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan SMP took its place), demonstrated against the zakat ordinance and besieged the Federal Secretariat building in Islamabad for two days, the Shias argued that the government’s proposals were not in line with their traditions. For centuries the Shias had maintained that Zakat should be donated on a voluntary basis and that no government had the right to collect it’. Faced with the strong Shias protest and the significant pressure by the revolutionary Iran, made Zia to exempt Shias from all those aspects of the Islamization package which contravened Shia law.

(N.V.R.Nasr 2002:88) ‘The Shia victory was considered a defeat for the ruling regime and for the Sunni Islamists. In the mind of Sunni Islamizers, Shiaism thus gradually becomes a problem for their desired Islamic State. This led Zia and his Islamist allies to develop a concerted strategy for containing Shia mobilization and limiting both Pakistanis Shias and Iran’s influence in Pakistan. The SSP (Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Sunni Militant organization) was founded in September 1985 at Jhang, to counter the rise of Shiaism, and apparently had the financial support of the Saudi Arabia and Iraq, both countries were concerned about Shia influence in the region. The Saudi and Iraqi involvement in effect imported the Iran-Iraq war into Pakistan as the SSP and its allies on one hand and the TJP and its allies on the other. The sectarian conflicts acquired a new dimension from 1988, and particularly so when the so-called Afghan Jihad was brought in Pakistan, after the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan. The assassination of Allama Hussain in August 1988(Iraq was probably involved) was a turning point; it was the first of a long series of sectarian killings’ which unleashed a cycle of inter-communal violence, which are continued till today. In February 1990, the SSP movement’s founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was assassinated, and then in December 1990 the consul general of Iran Sadiq Ganji was killed. The successors of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi were also murdered-Maulana Israr-ul-Qasmi in 1991 and Zia ul Rahman Farooqi in 1997, the last leader of the SSP was Maulana Azam Tariq assassinated in Islamabad on 6October 2003. These sectarian killings were not only confined to leaders and activists, symbols of state authority, main government functionaries, police officers judges, doctors, lawyers and traders, from both sides, were also targeted. A change was seen in 1997 with indiscriminate gunfire on ordinary citizens who were not involved in sectarian activities and whose only fault was to be either Sunni or Shia. (Mariam Abou Zahab 2002:118)

Madaris:( seminaries)
At the time of Pakistan’s independence there were an estimated 250 Madaris in the country. By 1987 it rose to 2,862, producing around 30,000 graduates each year, presently there are estimated 7000 to 8000 Madaris in Pakistan and between 60,000 to 70,000 students are attending them. Mostly in 1980s, these Madaris were established by Zia’s regime, as these Madaris were needed to produce anti-Soviet fighters for the Afghan War and could also be used to counter the Shia influence at home. Huge investment was made, to strengthen various Sunni institutions-in particular. (S.V.R.Nasr 2002: 90) ‘The Madaris received their fundings from larger religo-political parties or outside donors, and instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs and agenda to those donors (Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait). Their focus is less on training Ulema and more on producing sectarian activities, less on spiritual matters and more on sectarian hatred. Many Madaris provide military training to their students, combining sectarian vigilance with a Jihadist outlook, Students that come out of these seminaries have few skills that would encourage them to follow traditional careers in scholarship and religious services, or would allow them to join the mainstream economy. Many join the ranks of extremist Islamist parties and sectarian organizations’.

Afghan War:
(Ahmad Rashid 1996:161) ‘The Afghan war that spanned the decade between 1979 and 1989 not only flooded Pakistan with weapons and drugs, but also embedded militancy in the country’s Islamism. The Afghan war spawned several militant Islamist groups with international connections; according to one estimate over 25,000 volunteers from thirty countries were trained in Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan’. In addition, the afghan scene itself was wrought with sectarian tension as Shias and Persian speaking pro-Iranian factions vied for power and position with the Saudi and American backed Mujahideen groups based in Pakistan’(Oliver Roy 1990). (S.V.R.Nasr 2002: 94) ‘The rivalry between these two groups and the competition for control of Afghanistan ineluctably spilled over into Pakistan. Pakistan’s sectarian conflict, therefore, quickly became a regional affair. As a result, Pakistan’s response to sectarianism became entangled with its own afghan policy, the Afghan War was also important in that it flooded Pakistan with weapons of all kinds, and imprint militancy on its political culture, specially among Islamist groups. The ‘Kalashnikov Culture’ turned sectarian conflicts bloodier, and transformed militant organizations into paramilitary ones. The Kashmir conflict has played the same role, bolstering sectarianism in Pakistan’.

Present Situation:
It is a great irony that the scourge of Islamic fundamentalism has done more damage to the social and religious fabric of Islamic Pakistan, than anything else. Today Pakistan is paying a heavy social and political price and has become a victim of its own creation. The present government of General Musharraf is finding it extremely difficult to clean up the mess of Islamic fundamentalism.

It took just a few hours for the US administration to conclude that the 11th September attack had probably originated from Afghanistan and that any effective counter-attack would require the co-operation of Pakistan. The American message for the whole world countries was that ‘you are either with us or against us’. The Taliban government which showed no compliance, and refused to handover ‘Bin-Laden- number one suspect behind the September 11 attacks, had to go. (Benett Jones 2002: 2) ‘Musharraf realized that once the US had made up its mind to topple the Taliban there was no point for Pakistan continuing to support them’. For General Musharraf it was not an easy task, it was not only the overthrow of Taliban government, but also directly confronting thousands of Islamic radicals within inside his own country, who took to the streets in all the major cities of Pakistan, swearing loyalty to their Islamic brethren in Afghanistan.

From the beginning of his rule, General Musharraf has never made any secret of his modernist views. While Zia had used his military might to try to Islamize Pakistan, Musharraf was indicating that he wanted to modernize the Pakistani State. (Bennett Jones 2002:20) ‘The first act he did, in April 2000, he backed a proposal to reform Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy law. The Islamic parties, however, strongly opposed the change and on May 2000, Musharraf backed down. Despite his failure to change the blasphemy law, Musharraf continued to express opposition to religious extremism. In June 2001, well before the attacks on the twin towers in New York, he gave a keynote speech to leading Pakistani Islamic scholars and clerics whom the government had transported to Islamabad for the purpose. His comments, which struck many of his audience dumb, comprised one of the clearest statements of Islamic modernism ever made by a Pakistani leader. ‘How does the world look at us?’ he asked, ‘the world sees us backward and constantly going under. Is there any doubt that we have been left behind although we claim Islam will carry us forward in every age, every circumstances and every land….? How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as terrorists. We have been killing each other. And now we want to spread violence and terror abroad. Naturally the world regards us as terrorists. Our claim of tolerance is phony…we never tire of talking about the status that Islam accords to women. We only pay lip-service to its teachings. We do not act upon it. This is hypocrisy’. (B.Jones:21)The June speech was a major political event in Pakistan. Since the 1950s no Pakistani leader had dared to speak to the clerics in this way.

(Bennett Jones 2002:24) ‘From the moment General Musharraf took power, he made it clear that he considered those involved in sectarian violence to be terrorists. In August 2001, he felt strong enough to ban ‘Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’ and ‘Sipah-e-Mohammad’ Pakistan. The ban marked a significant development which indicated that Musharraf was prepared to take some risks in confronting the Islamic radicals. But once again there were questions about implementation. The killing rate did diminish after the ban-but only for a few weeks. In practical terms, the ban made little difference since many activists from the two organizations, already wanted for murder, and were keeping a low profile. Nevertheless, Musharraf had laid down the foundations of his policy towards religious extremism and, after 11 September, he was to build on it. Before 11 September he had concentrated his attack on those responsible for sectarian violence. In the immediate aftermath of 11 September he had seen off the pro-Taliban clerics who tried to organize street protests against him. But he still faced one major obstacle that stood in the way of a full-blow assault on the radicals: Kashmir’.

Kashmir- the unsettled problem of the British Partition of Indian-Sub-continent is a disputed area between Pakistan and India. Pakistan argues that this unsettled problem should be solved according to the United Nations Resolutions, while India considers Kashmir as its own part; both the countries had fought three wars over Kashmir. Ever since 1988, when the insurgency against the Indian security forces in Kashmir had begun, Pakistan had officially provided diplomatic, moral and political support to the Kashmiri militants.

After 11 September US policy changed. The fundamental problem for Pakistan was that the United States was no longer prepared to accept Islamabad’s claims that there was no connection between Afghanistan and Kashmir. Washington had a point. Links clearly did exist. For a start, Taliban and the Pakistani-based Kashmiri militant groups had the same origins. Both had emerged from the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1990s Pakistan’s military establishment felt it was in a strong position. Its close ties to the Taliban allowed the ISI to produce a cadre of well-trained militants who could fight in Kashmir. But after 11 September the policy unraveled. The US was no longer prepared to turn a blind eye to the Afghanistan-Kashmir nexus. Having decided to back the US-led coalition Musharraf had nowhere to turn. Then on 13 December 2001 Indian parliament was attacked by five armed men, during the thirty-minute gun battle the attackers killed six Indian security personnel and a gardener before they too were shot down. Nobody claimed responsibility for the attack but Indian leaders immediately blamed Pakistan-backed Islamic militants. From this incident the already unpleasant relations between the two countries, got worse. India called its commissioner from Islamabad, cut rail and other transport links with Pakistan and moved missiles, fighter aircrafts and tens of thousands of troops to the Pakistani border. The prospect of yet another military conflict, possibly full-scale war, between two nuclear powers put Musharraf under still more pressure. (Bennett Jones 2002:27)

The general now realized that he had little choice but to reverse Pakistan’s long-standing policy of backing the Kashmir insurgency. On 12 January 2002 he delivered a landmark speech in which he announced a ban of almost all the most prominent Pakistan-based militant groups, he said ‘No organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir’.

Conclusion:
Islam has always been exploited and politicizes by different leaders in Pakistan. The most prominent amongst them was General Zia-ul-Haq, who not only politicized religion but militarized it as well. It is very much true that Islam is rooted in the Pakistani society but not the militant Islam. Pakistan was certainly not made for religious extremism. (Mariam Abou Zahab 2002:115) ‘The Sunni-Shia conflicts were mostly unknown before partition in the areas which now form Pakistan because of the influence of Pirs and Sufis, relations between Shias and Sunni remained normal except for occasional riots or minor clashes during Muharram ceremonies. The state was neutral and had no sectarian agenda’. It was later on that these militant-sectarian organizations were created and nursed by different regimes for their own political purposes. (Tariq Ali: 195) ‘The strength of religious extremism has till now been derived from state patronage rather than popular support. These militant groups that have paralyzed the country for two decades were the creation of General Zial-ul-Haq, who received political, Military and financial support from the United States and Britain throughout his eleven years as dictator of Pakistan’. The west needed Zia to fight its Afghan war against the former Soviet Union, and Zia needed the Mullahs’ political support for his illegal regime and also to utilize ‘Mullah Power’ to combat Pakistan’s People’s Party(PPP) and groups further to the left.(Tariq Ali 1983:139). Zia Islamization, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and the Afghan War and Kashmir were enabling factors which gave scale and sustenance to the sectarianism and militancy in Pakistan. The present government of General Musharraf has, for the first time, demonstrated to reverse Zia’s legacy. Ironically both men were presented with the opportunity to pursue their diametrically-opposed agendas because Washington needed to secure Pakistan’s support to determine the course of events in Afghanistan. Only one of his predecessors, Ayub Khan, attempted to confront the radicals. He failed. It is not yet clear whether Musharraf will succeed? (Bennett Jones 2002:30-33)